Ideas from 'Sameness and Substance Renewed' by David Wiggins [2001], by Theme Structure

[found in 'Sameness and Substance Renewed' by Wiggins,David [CUP 2001,0-521-45619-3]].

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1. Philosophy / F. Analytic Philosophy / 4. Conceptual Analysis

11832

We learn a concept's relations by using it, without reducing it to anything

5. Theory of Logic / F. Referring in Logic / 3. Property (λ-) Abstraction

11863

(λx)[Man x] means 'the property x has iff x is a man'.

7. Existence / A. Nature of Existence / 6. Criterion for Existence

14746

What exists can't depend on our conceptual scheme, and using all conceptual schemes is too liberal [Sider]

9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 5. Individuation / a. Individuation

11900

We can accept criteria of distinctness and persistence, without making the counterfactual claims [Mackie,P]

11870

Activity individuates natural things, functions do artefacts, and intentions do artworks

9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 5. Individuation / d. Individuation by haecceity

11866

The idea of 'thisness' is better expressed with designation/predication and particular/universal

9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 5. Individuation / e. Individuation by kind

11896

A sortal essence is a thing's principle of individuation [Mackie,P]

15835

Wiggins's sortal essentialism rests on a thing's principle of individuation [Mackie,P]

11841

The evening star is the same planet but not the same star as the morning star, since it is not a star

10679

'Sortalism' says parts only compose a whole if it falls under a sort or kind [Hossack]

14363

Identity a=b is only possible with some concept to give persistence and existence conditions [Strawson,P]

14364

A thing is necessarily its highest sortal kind, which entails an essential constitution [Strawson,P]

11851

Many predicates are purely generic, or pure determiners, rather than sortals

11865

The possibility of a property needs an essential sortal concept to conceive it

9. Objects / B. Unity of Objects / 3. Unity Problems / d. Coincident objects

14744

Objects can only coincide if they are of different kinds; trees can't coincide with other trees [Sider]

9. Objects / B. Unity of Objects / 3. Unity Problems / e. Vague objects

11852

Is the Pope's crown one crown, if it is made of many crowns?

11875

Boundaries are not crucial to mountains, so they are determinate without a determinate extent

9. Objects / C. Structure of Objects / 5. Composition of an Object

14749

Identity is an atemporal relation, but composition is relative to times [Sider]

9. Objects / C. Structure of Objects / 8. Parts of Objects / c. Wholes from parts

11844

If I destroy an item, I do not destroy each part of it

9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 3. Individual Essences

11861

We can forget about individual or particularized essences

9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 8. Essence as Explanatory

11871

Essences are not explanations, but individuations

9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 9. Essence and Properties

11879

Essentialism is best represented as a predicate-modifier: □(a exists → a is F) [Mackie,P]

9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 13. Nominal Essence

11835

The nominal essence is the idea behind a name used for sorting

9. Objects / E. Objects over Time / 4. Four-Dimensionalism

11876

It is easier to go from horses to horse-stages than from horse-stages to horses

9. Objects / E. Objects over Time / 9. Ship of Theseus

11858

The question is not what gets the title 'Theseus' Ship', but what is identical with the original

9. Objects / F. Identity among Objects / 1. Concept of Identity

11843

Identity over a time and at a time aren't different concepts

11864

Hesperus=Hesperus, and Phosphorus=Hesperus, so necessarily Phosphorus=Hesperus

9. Objects / F. Identity among Objects / 2. Defining Identity

11831

The formal properties of identity are reflexivity and Leibniz's Law

9. Objects / F. Identity among Objects / 3. Relative Identity

14362

Relative Identity is incompatible with the Indiscernibility of Identicals [Strawson,P]

11838

Relativity of Identity makes identity entirely depend on a category

11847

To identify two items, we must have a common sort for them

9. Objects / F. Identity among Objects / 8. Leibniz's Law

11839

Do both 'same f as' and '=' support Leibniz's Law?

11845

Substitutivity, and hence most reasoning, needs Leibniz's Law

10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 1. Possible Worlds / d. Possible worlds actualism

11869

Possible worlds rest on the objects about which we have suppositions

10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 2. Nature of Possible Worlds / b. Worlds as fictions

11850

Not every story corresponds to a possible world

14. Science / D. Explanation / 2. Types of Explanation / k. Explanations by essence

11848

Asking 'what is it?' nicely points us to the persistence of a continuing entity

18. Thought / D. Concepts / 2. Origin of Concepts / a. Origin of concepts

11859

The mind conceptualizes objects; yet objects impinge upon the mind

18. Thought / D. Concepts / 3. Ontology of Concepts / c. Fregean concepts

11836

We can use 'concept' for the reference, and 'conception' for sense

26. Natural Theory / B. Natural Kinds / 3. Knowing Kinds

11860

Lawlike propensities are enough to individuate natural kinds